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STEP ZERO AFTER CITY OF ARLINGTON 
Thomas W. Merrill* 
INTRODUCTION 
The thirty-year history of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.1 is a story of triumph in the courts and frustration on 
the part of administrative law scholars.2  Chevron‘s appeal for the courts 
rests in significant part on its ease of application as a decisional device.  
Questions about the validity of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute are 
reduced to two inquiries:  whether the statute itself provides a clear answer 
and, if not, whether the agency‘s answer is a reasonable one.  The 
framework can be applied to virtually any statutory interpretation question 
resolved by an agency, and its component elements—―clarity‖ and 
―reasonableness‖—are sufficiently flexible to permit virtually any outcome 
in any particular case.  Chevron also serves as the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
most important admonition to lower courts not to substitute their judgment 
for agencies‘ on matters of policy, at least those matters that have not been 
resolved by Congress itself.  Thus, Chevron can be invoked, when the 
circumstances warrant, as a symbol of judicial restraint. 
The frustration of many administrative law scholars rests on Chevron‘s 
awkwardness in discharging important functions of judicial review of 
agency action.  Judicial review performs a variety of functions, including 
protecting individuals from arbitrary bureaucratic action and promoting 
accountability by requiring agencies to explain the reasons for their 
decisions.  I will focus here on another important function of judicial 
review, which I will call boundary maintenance.  Boundary maintenance 
includes, importantly, the principle of legislative supremacy—that agencies 
must respect the will of Congress.  Congress is the institution best situated 
to allocate governmental authority among different institutions in a federal 
system, and when Congress has settled on a division of powers, it is critical 
 
*  Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.  I filed an amicus curiae brief in 
support of the petitioners in City of Arlington v. FCC on behalf of the National Governors 
Association and other state and local government associations. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 
the Nat‘l Governors Ass‘n, et al. in Support of Petitioners, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863 (2013) (Nos. 11-1545, 11-1547), 2012 WL 5982593. 
 
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. This Article is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and 
Looking Forward.  For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475 (2014). 
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that courts respect and enforce it.3  But boundary maintenance also draws 
upon other important precepts, such as the requirements that agencies honor 
individuals‘ rights, abstain from interfering with authority given to other 
agencies, abide by relevant obligations contained in international law, and 
respect the traditional prerogatives of state and local governments. 
Although Congress is the appropriate institution to establish the 
boundaries of agency authority ex ante, courts are well suited to resolve 
disputes over the scope of agency authority that arise ex post.4  One reason 
is that judges are relatively less biased about matters of government 
authority than other governmental institutions are likely to be.5  Federal 
judges, in particular, enjoy life tenure and secure compensation, and so are 
comparatively more insulated from the political passions of the day.  This is 
not to say that judges are free from ideological predilections or intellectual 
fashions.  But they are relatively more impartial than other, more politically 
responsive governmental institutions.  They are not perfect umpires but are 
better than any of the alternatives.  A second reason is that judges are 
poorly situated to seize significant political authority for themselves.  They 
are largely limited to deciding cases brought by others, and, at the higher 
levels of the judicial hierarchy, can decide only a small fraction of contested 
cases in any given year.  Moreover, because each judge exercises individual 
judgment in deciding the cases courts do hear, it is very difficult for courts 
to achieve the coordination that would be necessary to take control of policy 
on a sustained basis in any given area.6  In Alexander Hamilton‘s famous 
expression, the judiciary is the ―least dangerous‖ branch,7 and hence the 
safest to task with resolving disputes over the boundaries of the power 
exercised by others. 
Chevron is poorly designed to allow courts to perform this boundary 
maintenance function.  The key problem is that the principles that inform 
the location of the various boundaries of agency authority are not ordinarily 
found in ―clear‖ legislative texts.  Sometimes they are, in which case courts 
can enforce these limitations at Step One of the Chevron framework.  But 
more often, the relevant boundaries are found in constitutional doctrines, 
judicial precedents, and established practices that have evolved over time 
regarding the conduct of governmental affairs—custom or tradition or the 
―small c‖ constitution if you will.8  Step One of Chevron, which asks 
whether Congress has spoken clearly to the precise issue in controversy, 
 
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 452, 474–75 (2010). 
 4. The following discussion can be regarded as a form of generalized institutional 
realism about courts, especially federal courts. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Institutional 
Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 5. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124–28 (1994). 
 6. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 123–32 (2006). 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001). 
 8. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (developing the idea that certain 
important statutes and their evolved interpretation represent a ―small c‖ constitution). 
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provides no obvious way of enforcing these understandings.9  Conceivably, 
they could come into play at Step Two, which asks whether the agency‘s 
interpretation is reasonable.10  But the dominant understanding of Step Two 
has been that the courts ask whether the agency has adopted a reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory text, not whether it has acted reasonably in 
light of broader traditions about the division of authority among 
governmental institutions and between government and individual.11 
There are, in principle, three ways to reconcile the traditional judicial 
function of boundary maintenance with Chevron‘s reductionist two-step 
framework.  One would be to overrule Chevron, or at least to cabin it as a 
special doctrine that applies only when Congress has expressly delegated 
authority to an agency to engage in the interpretation of a particular 
statutory term.  This would have been feasible in the early years after 
Chevron was decided.  There is no evidence that the Justices who joined the 
opinion regarded it as a significant revision of administrative law,12 and 
even its author, Justice Stevens, tried in later decisions to limit Chevron to 
questions of statutory application.13  But Chevron has now been invoked in 
far too many decisions to make overruling it a feasible option for the Court.  
And cabining Chevron to cases of express delegation of authority to 
interpret particular statutory provisions also has been explicitly or implicitly 
rejected by the Court,14 and this too would seem to be too unsettling to be 
feasible. 
Another accommodation would be to transform Chevron‘s Step One, or 
conceivably Step Two, into a wide-ranging inquiry that includes boundary 
maintenance as well as ordinary statutory interpretation.  This is a path the 
Court has occasionally taken.  For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,15 the Court concluded after an examination of the lengthy 
history of interaction between Congress and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) that Congress had ―clearly‖ denied the FDA 
jurisdiction over tobacco products.  The decision was ostensibly rendered 
under Chevron‘s Step One but was indistinguishable from an exercise in de 
novo review—looking to a vast array of contextual evidence to resolve an 
important question of boundary maintenance.  More recently, in Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA,16 the Court concluded that the Environmental 
 
 9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
853 (2001). 
 12. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron:  The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 
66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 275–77 (2014). 
 13. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 529–30 (2013) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). 
 14. For explicit rejection, see Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011) (declining, in the tax context, to follow 
precedent limiting Chevron-style deference to agency interpretations authorized by express 
delegations of interpretative authority). 
 15. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 16. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014). 
756 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Protection Agency (EPA) had acted unreasonably in interpreting ―any air 
pollutant‖ to include greenhouse gases for purposes of certain stationary 
source provisions of the Clean Air Act.  Although the decision was 
ostensibly based on Chevron‘s Step Two, the Court concluded that the 
agency‘s interpretation was unreasonable in part because it ―would bring 
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA‘s regulatory 
authority without clear congressional authorization.‖17  In other words, the 
Court was engaging in boundary maintenance through an aggressive 
application of Step Two.  The problem with blowing up Step One or Step 
Two in this fashion is that it transforms Chevron from a deference doctrine 
into a form of de novo review, yet it does so episodically and without any 
announced basis for the circumstances that trigger such a transformation in 
the doctrine. 
The third accommodation would be to develop a set of threshold 
conditions that would have to be satisfied before the Chevron doctrine, in 
its original two-step formulation, would apply.  The Court took a major step 
in this direction in United States v. Mead Corp.,18 in which it set forth (in a 
rather muddled fashion) the threshold conditions that must be satisfied 
before a court can conclude that Congress has delegated the type of 
authority to an agency that will trigger Chevron review.  This has come to 
be known as Chevron ―Step Zero.‖19  Recently, in City of Arlington v. 
FCC,20 the petitioners asked the Court to adopt an additional threshold 
condition—a determination that the interpretational question at issue falls 
within the scope of the agency‘s jurisdiction—before Chevron applies.  
Their proposal, in effect, was to expand Step Zero to allow courts to resolve 
this important question of boundary maintenance before turning to 
Chevron.21  In an opinion by Justice Scalia, writing for the Court‘s two 
most conservative and three most liberal members, the Court rejected the 
invitation to cabin Chevron in this fashion.22  The unifying impulse behind 
this odd coalition seemed to be the perception that a ―jurisdictional‖ 
 
 17. Id. at 2444.  In sharp contrast, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court concluded that the 
plain meaning of ―air pollutant‖ included greenhouse gases, this decision being an exercise 
of Chevron Step One. 549 U.S. 497, 527–29 (2007).  Both decisions reveal shifting 
majorities of the Court manipulating Chevron Step One and Step Two to overturn agency 
policy judgments. 
 18. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 19. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 873.  In this symposium, a number of 
other contributors also focus extensively on Mead and Chevron Step Zero. See Jack M. 
Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 731, 741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
789, 792–93 (2014).  Another contribution relies on a dataset of 730 pre- and post-Chevron 
Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the use of Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace-law 
context. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace:  Unhappy Together, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (2014).  And a final contribution argues that federalism concerns 
should play no role at Chevron Step Zero. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 646–52 (2014). 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 21. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
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exception to Chevron would be too uncertain to permit principled 
application.23 
The dissenters in City of Arlington, led by Chief Justice Roberts, 
protested that giving Chevron deference to agencies‘ views about the scope 
of their own authority was completely at odds with what I have called the 
boundary maintenance function of the courts.  As he put it, ―[a]n agency 
cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an 
agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference 
to the agency.‖24  He also suggested, intriguingly, that courts could 
effectively monitor attempts by agencies to transgress the boundaries of 
their delegated authority by applying the Mead factors in an appropriately 
particularized fashion.25  The suggestion was that courts should carefully 
calibrate the scope of the delegation to agencies to act with the force of law, 
taking into account both affirmative grants of delegated power and negative 
limitations on those grants.26 
This Article considers whether the traditional boundary maintenance 
function of judicial review can be reconciled with Chevron through 
appropriate implementation of Step Zero.  I begin by reviewing the 
rationale for Step Zero, its rather confusing adoption in Mead, and the 
failed attempt to expand Step Zero in City of Arlington.  I then argue that 
City of Arlington has solidified the Court‘s commitment to Step Zero, at 
least as articulated in Mead.  Next, I turn to Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
suggestion that a more carefully calibrated application of the Mead factors 
could serve as a substitute for an explicit ―agency jurisdiction‖ inquiry as 
part of Step Zero.  I conclude that the Chief Justice‘s suggestion represents 
the best available solution to reconciling Chevron with the courts‘ 
traditional boundary maintenance function.  The Chief Justice‘s approach 
would situate the boundary maintenance function as part of Step Zero, 
where the court engages in de novo review.  This would suggest that the 
reviewing court is free to ignore the views of the agency—which is 
unfortunate.  Nevertheless, it would allow courts to draw upon traditions 
other than Chevron, such as the doctrines that inform questions of 
separation of powers, individual constitutional rights, and preemption of 
state law, in deciding whether the agency has transgressed the limits of its 
authority.  It would also allow courts to consider a variety of contextual 
sources, such as the history of an agency‘s exercise of regulatory authority 
in a particular area, in asking whether Congress intended the agency to act 
with the force of law with respect to the issue in question.  The Chief 
Justice‘s proposal can be regarded as a second-best solution to preserving 
the boundary maintenance function of courts in a world in which the 
Supreme Court is committed to preserving Chevron.  His solution would 
provide better guidance to lower courts and agencies than having the 
Supreme Court engage in episodic and unpredictable manipulation of 
 
 23. See infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. 
 24. 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 1884. 
 26. Id. at 1880–84. 
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Chevron‘s Step One and Step Two.  It might also do more to promote the 
use of Chevron as a genuine mandate for deference to agency views. 
I.   WHY STEP ZERO? 
Chevron did not itself use the terms ―Step One‖ and ―Step Two‖ in 
describing how courts should evaluate agency interpretations of statutes.  
But lower courts quickly dubbed it the ―two-step framework,‖27 and this 
locution is now familiar.  Although the formulation of the steps varies, Step 
One is generally thought to require courts to determine whether the statute 
has a ―clear‖ meaning with respect to the issue in controversy.28  If the 
answer is yes, then the court adopts this meaning (which of course might be 
the agency‘s interpretation).  If the court concludes that the statute is not 
clear, then it moves on to Step Two, where the relevant inquiry is whether 
the agency‘s interpretation is ―reasonable‖ or ―permissible.‖  If the answer 
to this question is affirmative, then the court upholds the agency 
interpretation; if not, the court either remands to the agency or adopts its 
own interpretation of the statute. 
Chevron said relatively little about the threshold conditions that would 
trigger the application of this two-step approach, other than to note in 
passing that the EPA, whose interpretation was at issue, had been ―entrusted 
to administer‖ the Clean Air Act.29  Later decisions also spoke vaguely 
about interpretations of statutes that an agency had been ―charged‖ with 
administering.30  As time passed, it became increasingly clear that a more 
precise understanding of what was required to trigger the Chevron two-step 
approach was needed.  Because Chevron had already commandeered Steps 
One and Two, Kristin Hickman and I, in an article published in 2001, 
dubbed this threshold inquiry Chevron ―Step Zero,‖ and this locution has 
caught on.31  Three considerations, in particular, made it imperative to 
develop a more precise conception of when Chevron should be applied. 
One reason some limiting principle was necessary is that Chevron 
included language about the rationale for deference that was vastly 
overbroad.  In a key passage, Justice Stevens noted that sometimes 
Congress explicitly delegates authority to agencies to define specific 
statutory provisions.  When it does so, he observed, the agencies‘ 
interpretations are ―given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‖32  Without missing a beat, 
Justice Stevens immediately added:  ―Sometimes the legislative delegation 
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such 
 
 27. See, e.g., Int‘l Bd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 28. Sometimes Step One is framed in terms of the opposite of ―clear,‖ where it is 
generally said the statute is ―ambiguous‖ or contains a ―gap.‖  E.g., Nat‘l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
 29. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 30. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996). 
 31. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 836–37.  The phrase was given an important 
boost by Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006). 
 32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.‖33  This passage suggested that any time Congress has left a gap or 
ambiguity in a statute administered by an agency this should be viewed as 
an ―implied delegation‖ of interpretative authority to the agency, and that 
this entitles the agency to deference. 
Taken literally, the idea that any gap or ambiguity is an implied 
delegation to an agency would represent a massive expansion of 
administrative authority.  The standard assumption, derived from the 
nondelegation doctrine, is that agencies have no authority to act unless 
power is delegated to them.34  Every statute contains gaps and ambiguities.  
If gaps and ambiguities are implied delegations, then once Congress 
delegates any authority to an agency, it could limit the delegation only by 
enacting clear statutory language restricting that authority.  In other words, 
rather than putting the burden on an agency to show authority to act, the 
burden would be on Congress to constrain the agency‘s authority to act by 
unambiguous language.35  There is no support in our constitutional 
traditions for such an inversion of the standard assumption about 
delegation.  Even Chevron‘s most enthusiastic champions admit that the 
idea of an ―implied delegation‖ is a fiction.36  As to whether Congress has 
embraced such an understanding, such evidence as exists suggests the 
opposite.37 
The novelty and implausibility of the implied delegation fiction 
suggested the need for a more persuasive basis for concluding that Congress 
has delegated interpretational authority to the agency.38  The identification 
of this triggering set of circumstances would obviously have to be 
undertaken before applying the Chevron two-step.  In other words, the 
identification would have to be made at Step Zero. 
A second reason why some threshold inquiry was needed was that it 
became increasingly clear—as it should have been from the beginning—
that Chevron cannot serve as the exclusive standard for reviewing questions 
of statutory interpretation decided by agencies.  For example, the Court has 
never suggested that trans-substantive statutes like the Administrative 
Procedure Act39 (APA) or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act40 
(RFRA) should be interpreted by giving deference to agency 
interpretations.41  Such statutes are designed to constrain agency action—
 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1:  From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2109–14 (2004). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17. 
 37. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 470–76 (1989). 
 38. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 874–88. 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb–1 to 2000bb–4 (2012). 
 41. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (holding that 
Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations of the APA).  The Court recently 
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they have always been and will continue to be interpreted by courts through 
exercises in independent judgment about the meaning of contested 
provisions.  Nor has the Court ever suggested that it would defer to agency 
views regarding the meaning of statutes that have traditionally been 
enforced by the courts, such as the criminal law or the antitrust laws. 
Conceivably, one could operate with two standards of review—de novo 
review for the APA, criminal law, and statutes like the antitrust laws, and 
Chevron review for statutes a particular agency has been ―charged‖ or 
―entrusted‖ with administering.  But this simple move became untenable 
once the Court, in a series of post-Chevron decisions, reaffirmed that there 
are in fact two deference doctrines, even in cases where agencies have in 
some sense been singled out as having authority to administer the statute.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) proved to be the 
key stumbling block.  Some years before Chevron, the Court had adopted 
the discretionary standard of review articulated by Justice Jackson in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.42 for purposes of reviewing a statutory 
interpretation by the EEOC.43  Skidmore deference, as it came to be called, 
requires courts to consider a number of contextual factors that make an 
agency interpretation more or less persuasive to the court.44  Some years 
after Chevron, over Justice Scalia‘s objections, the Court reaffirmed that 
Skidmore was the proper standard for evaluating EEOC interpretations.45  
This was followed by other decisions which also applied or reaffirmed 
Skidmore in a variety of employment-related contexts.  The most prominent 
of these decisions, Christensen v. Harris County,46 found all but Justice 
Scalia reaffirming the continued vitality of Skidmore deference in 
appropriate circumstances, although, as I will discuss momentarily, it also 
revealed some deep schisms about the proper way to understand the 
relationship between Chevron and Skidmore. 
Once it became clear that the Court was committed to applying two 
different deference doctrines when an agency has been ―entrusted‖ in some 
sense with administration of the statute, some kind of Step Zero became 
inevitable.  The full menu of review standards included three options:  
sometimes de novo review was appropriate (as in cases involving the 
meaning of the APA or where courts act as the implementing body); 
sometimes Skidmore was appropriate (as in cases reviewing agencies like 
the EEOC); and sometimes Chevron was appropriate (as in cases involving 
the EPA and the like).  Obviously, a court should determine which standard 
is appropriate before it undertakes to resolve the question at hand.  The 
 
invalidated a regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services for violating 
RFRA; no suggestion was made by any Justice that the agency was entitled to deference for 
its interpretation of the Act. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014). 
 42. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 43. The Court adopted Skidmore as the standard for reviewing EEOC interpretations in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–46 (1976). 
 44. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 45. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991). 
 46. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
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process of sorting out the relevant scope of these divergent standards 
required the development of something like Step Zero. 
A third reason why a threshold inquiry became imperative was that 
multiple conflicts and controversies emerged over time about the scope of 
the Chevron doctrine.  In our 2001 article, Hickman and I counted fourteen 
unresolved questions about Chevron‘s domain.47  I will not repeat the full 
list.  Examples included:  whether Chevron applies to statutes enforced by 
multiple agencies; whether Chevron applies to interpretations set forth in 
interpretative rules or opinion letters; whether Chevron applies to 
interpretations offered by lower-level employees in an agency; whether 
Chevron applies to agency interpretations that conflict with judicial 
precedent; and whether Chevron applies to agency interpretations about the 
scope of the agency‘s authority—the issue presented in City of Arlington.48  
As time passed, additional important conflicts emerged, such as whether 
Chevron applies to agency judgments about the preemptive effect of a 
statutory provision.49 
Conceivably, the Supreme Court could resolve these conflicts on an ad 
hoc basis, or simply leave them to fester in the lower courts.  But a much 
better solution would be to adopt a principled understanding of the 
threshold conditions for the application of the Chevron doctrine, which 
could then be applied by lower courts in sorting out, as they arise, the many 
issues about the proper scope of Chevron.  A principled understanding of 
Step Zero would go far toward bringing the burgeoning discord about 
Chevron‘s domain under control. 
In short, three mutually supporting reasons emerged after 1984, each of 
which suggested that Chevron-style review is appropriate in some 
circumstances but not others.  By the time oral argument was held in City of 
Arlington, the Court itself had taken to calling this threshold inquiry Step 
Zero.50 
II.   THE CONTENT OF STEP ZERO 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, starting in roughly the tenth 
year of Our Chevron, the Supreme Court began to intimate what Step Zero 
might look like.  As previously noted, Chevron itself had spoken about 
express and implied ―delegations‖ of interpretative authority.51  Justice 
Scalia, in a law review article (written shortly after he joined the Court) had 
opined that Chevron rests on a ―fiction[]‖ of congressional intent to 
delegate interpretational authority to agencies to fill in the gaps created by 
 
 47. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 848–52. 
 48. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013). 
 49. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000). 
 50. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (Nos. 11–
1545, 11–1547) (Breyer, J.); id. at 8 (Scalia, J.); id. at 11, 26 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 28 
(Sotomayor, J.). 
 51. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
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unclear statutes.52  The Court‘s Chevron decisions also began to speak more 
consistently of Chevron deference being a function of delegated authority 
from Congress.53 
This, of course, left open the critical question:  What kind of delegated 
authority should count as an (implied) delegation of interpretational 
authority?  One possibility, fleshed out in a law review article by John 
Duffy, was that delegated authority to promulgate legislative rules is the 
key.54  As Duffy observed, if Congress has delegated legislative rulemaking 
authority to an agency, and the agency uses this authority to resolve an 
ambiguity in a statute, the questions on review should be (a) whether the 
legislative rule conflicts with the statute and (b) if not, whether the rule is 
arbitrary and capricious.55  This is essentially Chevron Step One and Step 
Two.  This was nifty, but it failed to account for many decisions in which 
courts had applied Chevron in reviewing interpretations adopted in other 
decisional formats, such as adjudication. 
A.   Christensen v. Harris County 
Justice Thomas‘s opinion for the Court in Christensen v. Harris County56 
spoke more broadly about Chevron being the appropriate standard when an 
agency interprets a statute in a decision that has ―the force of law,‖ which 
he indicated by example would include ―formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking.‖57  This seemed to track a report of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, which similarly 
recommended that Chevron be limited to interpretations rendered with 
some degree of procedural formality, such as formal adjudication and 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.58  Justice Thomas in Christensen declined 
to give Chevron deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter about the 
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, because the letter was merely 
advisory and did not have the force of law.  Instead, the Department was 
entitled to Skidmore deference, asking whether its views were persuasive.  
Justice Thomas concluded that the Department‘s interpretation was not 
persuasive, and therefore it was rejected.59 
Foreshadowing future fissures, Justices Scalia and Breyer filed separate 
opinions in Christensen offering different views about the proper scope of 
Chevron.  Justice Scalia argued that there was only one deference 
doctrine—Chevron.  Skidmore was an ―anachronism‖ and should be 
 
 52. See Scalia, supra note 36, at 517. 
 53. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (―A precondition to 
deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.‖). 
 54. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
113, 199–202 (1998). 
 55. Id. at 202–03. 
 56. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 57. Id. at 587. 
 58. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS, RECOMMENDATION 89-5:  ACHIEVING JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF AGENCY 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 31–33 (1989). 
 59. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
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relegated to the dustbin of history.60  Chevron should apply whenever the 
court has the benefit of the ―authoritative‖ view of the agency about the 
meaning of a statutory gap or ambiguity.61  This was satisfied in 
Christensen, he said, because the Acting Administrator of the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor had announced the interpretation 
in an opinion letter, and this had been defended by the Solicitor General in 
an amicus brief cosigned by the Solicitor of Labor.62 
Justice Breyer also thought there was only one deference doctrine, but 
that it was the doctrine applied in Skidmore.  Chevron had not rendered 
Skidmore an anachronism; indeed it ―made no relevant change‖ in 
deference doctrine.63  Chevron should be understood simply as a decision 
that ―focused upon an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to 
certain agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the 
agency the legal authority to make those determinations.‖64  As to the scope 
of this additional factor supporting deference, Justice Breyer said, oddly 
enough, that Justice Scalia ―may well be right‖ that that the opinion letter 
was enough to elicit Chevron deference.65 
Hickman and I published our article on Step Zero shortly after 
Christensen was decided.  The article was intended to function as a 
restatement of the law of Chevron, rather than as a pitch for an ideal 
regime.66  Building on the growing consensus supporting implied 
delegation as the foundation of Chevron, we sought to unpack what kind of 
agency interpretations could fairly be said to represent an exercise of 
delegated interpretational authority.  Taking a cue from the majority 
opinion in Christensen and other decisions by the Court, we argued that two 
conditions should be met.  First, Congress must have delegated authority to 
the agency to act with the ―force of law,‖ either by conferring power on the 
agency to issue legislative regulations or binding adjudications.67  Second, 
the interpretation in question must have been made by the agency in the 
exercise of this authority—that is, it must have been rendered in a 
legislative rule or an adjudication that yields a self-enforcing order.68 
We argued that a delegation of authority to act with the force of law, in 
contrast to other types of delegations, is an appropriate signal that Congress 
intended the agency, rather than the courts, to play the primary role in 
making policy.  Not every agency and not every agency function is given 
authority to bind persons outside the agency with the force of law.  
 
 60. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 61. Id. at 591. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. In earlier writing, I advocated that Chevron be discarded in favor of an approach that 
would treat agency interpretations as a form of ―inter-branch‖ precedent. See Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).  By 2001, it 
was clear that Chevron was not going away. 
 67. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 874–89. 
 68. Id. 
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Restricting Chevron to agencies that have been delegated such authority 
narrows the scope of delegated authority to a subset of agencies and agency 
functions where one can plausibly say that Congress has conferred highly 
significant powers on the agency.69 
We further argued that limiting Chevron to interpretations rendered by 
the agency in the exercise of delegated authority to act with the force of law 
was necessary to preserve the limitations on congressional delegations.  
Giving Chevron-style deference to interpretations rendered in non-binding 
formats like opinion letters or amicus briefs would in effect allow agencies 
to leverage their delegated authority beyond the limits prescribed by 
Congress.70 
Finally, we said that requiring the interpretation emerge through legally 
binding agency action would tend to limit Chevron to circumstances in 
which some kind of relatively formal public process has been followed in 
rendering an interpretation.  We noted that the match would not be perfect, 
since agencies can, for example, forego notice-and-comment procedures for 
good cause in issuing legislative rules.71  Still, the ―force of law‖ limitation 
would tend in the large run of cases to reinforce the correlation between 
Chevron deference and the use of some kind of process in which public 
input occurs at the agency level. 
The article, perhaps unfortunately, did not probe deeply into what it 
means for an agency to act with the ―force of law.‖  We did say that it refers 
to the capacity of an agency to compel behavior by persons outside the 
agency, on pain of suffering adverse consequences (sanctions) for failing to 
conform to the agency edict.72  We said that the only types of agency action 
that have the force of law in this sense are legislative regulations and self-
executing adjudications.73  And we tried to make clear that, although 
agency action having the force of law has certain consequences for the 
procedures agencies must follow (subject to exceptions for good cause, 
etc.), and that action having the force of law should have certain 
consequences for the degree of deference a court gives the agency, neither 
the procedures the agency employs nor the deference the court gives the 
agency determines whether its action has the force of law.74  In hindsight, 
we should have made more of an effort to clarify that agency action has the 
force of law when Congress and the agency intend that the agency‘s action 
will have the force of law, i.e., both the delegator and the delegatee intend 
that agency action will compel certain behavior by persons outside the 
agency.  The procedures an agency follows may provide evidence of the 
 
 69. Id. at 876. 
 70. Id. at 883–84. 
 71. Id. at 885; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012) (exempting rules related to military 
affairs and agency personnel management or loans or grants from notice-and-comment 
requirements); id. § 553(b) (exempting interpretative rules, statements of policy or 
organizational rules from notice-and-comment, and allowing agencies to forego notice-and-
comment for good cause). 
 72. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 881. 
 73. Id. at 882. 
 74. Id. 
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agency‘s intent, but the procedures do not themselves give agency action 
the force of law.  Similarly, the deference a court gives to an agency‘s 
action does not give the agency‘s action the force of law.  The case law and 
the commentary have exhibited considerable confusion on these points,75 
and our relatively brief treatment would have been more useful had we 
acknowledged the confusion and made a more sustained effort to explain 
how agency action having the force of law exists independently of agency 
procedures and judicial review. 
B.   United States v. Mead Corp. 
The three-way split over the proper scope of the Chevron doctrine in 
Christensen evidently persuaded the Court that better guidance was 
required.  The vehicle the Court selected for providing such guidance, 
United States v. Mead Corp.,76 was an unfortunate choice.  Mead involved 
a very idiosyncratic administrative process called tariff classification 
rulings.  These rulings did not correspond to any of the more familiar 
modes of administrative action, such as legislative rules, interpretative 
rules, opinion letters, adjudications, and so forth.77  They were letter rulings 
issued by the Customs Service in response to a request by an importer for 
advice as to what tariff applies to a proposed importation of goods.  The 
implementing regulations specified that these rulings were ―binding on all 
Customs Service personnel.‖78  But they did not bind anyone outside the 
agency, including the importer who sought the ruling, who could pay the 
tariff stated in the letter and then sue for a refund.  Nor were these rulings 
regarded as controlling for any other importation of goods, however 
similar.79  In effect, they were a safe pass given to an importer for purposes 
of a single importation of goods.  Typically, no public notice or opportunity 
to comment was provided before tariff classification rulings were issued, 
nor was the importer entitled to a hearing beyond the request for a ruling 
and the responsive letter.80  Tariff classification rulings were extremely 
numerous; forty-six different Customs Service offices issued over ten 
thousand rulings every year.81  Given the oddball nature of tariff 
classification rulings, it was hard to see how a decision whether Chevron 
should apply to an interpretation reflected in such a ruling would generalize 
to other, more typical modes of administrative action. 
The Court in Mead nevertheless gamely sought to synthesize a general 
understanding about the threshold conditions for applying Chevron.  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, commanded eight votes, 
including those of Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer.  The Souter opinion 
 
 75. See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
 76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 77. See id. at 221–22. 
 78. 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2000). 
 79. Id. § 177.9(c). 
 80. Mead, 533 U.S. at 223, 233. 
 81. Id. at 224. 
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reaffirmed or settled a number of contested questions.  It reaffirmed that 
federal administrative law includes two deference doctrines, the one 
articulated in Chevron and the one expressed in Skidmore.82  It reaffirmed 
that the ultimate touchstone for determining the proper standard of review is 
the intent of Congress, and that courts must decide, exercising de novo 
review, which standard applies.83  It reaffirmed the proposition set forth in 
Christensen that Chevron applies only to agency interpretations that have 
the ―force of law.‖84  It even seemed to endorse the two-part exegesis 
advanced in the Merrill/Hickman article (which appeared before Mead was 
decided and was cited by the Court in a footnote85), stating:  ―We hold that 
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies 
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise 
of that authority.‖86  In short, Mead held that Chevron is subject to a Step 
Zero inquiry, that the inquiry entails asking whether the agency has been 
delegated authority to act with the force of law, and that the interpretation 
must have been made in the exercise of such authority to qualify for 
Chevron deference.87  All this, in my view, was positive. 
Otherwise, the majority opinion was a mess.  The opinion left readers 
wondering whether having the force of law was an independent criterion, 
with certain consequences following for the required package of procedures 
in the usual case (but not always), or whether following certain procedures 
was in fact the test for determining whether action has the force of law.88  
Justice Souter was also clearly troubled by the question whether the odd-
duck tariff classification rulings could fairly be characterized as ―law,‖ 
given that they are a one-way day ticket having no precedential value, and 
can be issued, potentially in contradictory terms, by forty-six different 
regional offices.89  But he had been given little guidance as to what it means 
for agency action to be ―law.‖  For ordinary administrative law purposes, it 
is generally good enough to say that agency action has the ―force of law‖ 
when it binds actors outside the agency.90  Justice Souter evidently wanted 
to probe more deeply, yet he did not have the material at hand to do so in 
more than a very suggestive fashion.  All of which left lower courts and 
commentators scratching their heads. 
 
 82. Id. at 227–28, 234–35. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 226–27. 
 85. Id. at 230 n.11. 
 86. Id. at 226–27. 
 87. Id. 
 88. E.g., id. at 230 (―It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates 
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force.‖). 
 89. Id. at 232–34. 
 90. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, 309 (1979) (distinguishing 
binding rules that affect ―individual rights and obligations‖ from those that merely regulate 
an agency‘s ―own affairs‖). 
2014] STEP ZERO AFTER CITY OF ARLINGTON 767 
Two other factors, beyond the idiosyncratic facts, help explain the 
maddening application of Step Zero in Mead.  One was that Justice Souter 
likely was eager to secure the votes of both the Justices who had joined 
Justice Thomas‘s majority opinion in Christensen, which had viewed 
Chevron as distinct deference doctrine based on implied delegation,91 but 
also the votes of the three Justices who had joined Justice Breyer‘s dissent 
in Christensen, which had stated that Chevron had ―made no relevant 
change‖ in traditional deference doctrine other than to add a new factor to 
the conventional mix of variables determining how much deference is owed 
to an agency in any particular instance.92  This required Justice Souter to 
embrace both the understanding that Chevron rests on a delegation of 
interpretational authority to the agency, while simultaneously offering up a 
―Skidmore-ized‖ version of Chevron compatible with Justice Breyer‘s 
views about the need to consider multiple contextual factors in deciding 
how much deference to give to agency interpretations in any particular case. 
The second factor producing confusion was that Justice Souter appeared 
anxious to avoid casting doubt on any of the many dozens of Supreme 
Court decisions that previously had cited Chevron in reviewing an agency 
action.  In other words, he sought to state the threshold condition for 
applying Chevron in such a way that every prior Supreme Court decision 
could be viewed as having correctly anticipated the newly-articulated 
threshold condition.93  This was misguided and unnecessary, given that the 
question whether Chevron was the correct standard of review had not been 
at issue in these cases.  Nevertheless, by suggesting that Step Zero had been 
satisfied in every prior Chevron decision, Justice Souter left the threshold 
inquiry so flabby that even opinion letters might qualify in certain 
circumstances, contrary to Christensen.94 
Justice Scalia penned a lengthy and vitriolic dissent, which no other 
Justice joined.  It is clear that Justice Scalia was primarily exercised by the 
perpetuation of Skidmore as an alternative to Chevron.  Justice Scalia has 
long viewed Skidmore as a mushy standard—one he sarcastically 
characterized in Mead as ―th‘ol‘ ‗totality of the circumstances‘ test‖—
whereas he regards Chevron as a much more rule-like formulation.95  
Justice Scalia prefers rules over standards, in significant part because he 
believes they constrain willful decision making by judges eager to impose 
their policy preferences on society.96  Since the other eight Justices were all 
committed to the perpetuation of Skidmore in some circumstances, these 
fulminations fell on deaf ears.  Justice Scalia also complained, with greater 
 
 91. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31. 
 94. The Court stated that ―interpretive rules . . . enjoy no Chevron status as a class,‖ id. 
at 232, yet it also cited a decision applying Chevron to an opinion letter and said that the lack 
of formal procedures ―does not alone‖ bar the application of Chevron. Id. at 231 (citing 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995)). 
 95. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 96. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989). 
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justification, that the majority opinion was maddeningly imprecise about 
what sorts of agency actions would be entitled to Chevron review.97  To 
quell this complaint, Justice Souter should have said that Chevron is 
triggered when Congress gives authority to agencies to make legislative 
rules or to render self-executing adjudications, and the agency interprets the 
statute in the exercise of these delegated powers, and left it at that. 
For a while, it appeared that Mead had sowed greater confusion about the 
scope of Chevron than it had eliminated.  Lower courts and commentators 
were predictably confused by the all-things-considered aspects of the 
decision.98  Did this refer to the inquiry at Step Zero, or had Chevron been 
displaced by or merged with Skidmore, turning every deference decision 
into an all-things-considered inquiry?  Matters were made worse when, a 
year later, Justice Breyer penned a majority opinion in a Social Security 
case that seemed to invoke Skidmore-like variables in determining whether 
Chevron applies, and even suggested that Mead had dispensed with any 
―absolute rule‖ in favor of an ad hoc balancing test.99 
Gradually, however, decisions began accumulating at the Court in which 
Mead‘s two-part test was treated as a controlling statement of law regarding 
the conditions for applying Chevron.  Summarizing broadly, these decisions 
recognize that agency action is eligible for Chevron deference only if it has 
the ―force of law,‖ without offering any clarification of precisely what this 
means.  For example, notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal 
adjudication are treated as presumptively having the force of law,100 while 
interpretative rules, internal guidance documents, and repealed rules are 
recognized as beyond the pale.101 
Nevertheless, those aspects of Mead that appeared to endorse a 
―Skidmore-ized‖ Chevron continue to pop up in opinions authored by 
Justice Breyer.  For example, in Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke,102 
the question was whether a Department of Labor regulation exempting 
certain ―companionship services‖ from the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
entitled to Chevron deference.  Under the general two-part test of Mead, the 
answer was simple:  Congress had expressly delegated authority to the 
Labor Department to ―define[] and delimit[]‖ companionship services by 
regulation, and the Department had issued a regulation doing so.103  Writing 
 
 97. Mead, 533 U.S. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:  Mead in the 
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003). 
 99. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
 100. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (interpretation in formal 
adjudication entitled to Chevron deference). 
 101. See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (2013) (enforcement 
guideline no longer in effect not entitled to Chevron deference); Alaska Dep‘t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88 (2004) (internal guidance entitled only to 
respect); Wis. Dep‘t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (proposed 
regulation entitled only to Skidmore deference). 
 102. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 103. Id. at 172. 
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for a unanimous Court applying Chevron, Justice Breyer nevertheless made 
the inquiry much more complicated.  As he summarized: 
Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, 
where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the 
agency uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, 
where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and 
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that 
Congress intended it to defer to the agency‘s determination. See Mead.104 
The notion that the agency‘s ―full and direct focus‖ on an issue and the 
―reasonableness‖ of its rule are relevant to whether the Court should defer 
to the agency‘s interpretation sounds like Skidmore, not Chevron. 
The one constant in the Court‘s post-Mead decisions—at least until City 
of Arlington—was Justice Scalia‘s continued condemnation of the decision.  
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services,105 which held that agencies eligible for Chevron deference under 
Mead can effectively overrule prior judicial interpretations, Justice Scalia 
launched another vitriolic assault on Mead.106  He continued his campaign 
against Mead in separate opinions in several other decisions.107  None of 
these diatribes gathered the support of any other Justice.  Looking at the 
bigger picture, if one filters out the noise generated by Justices Breyer and 
Scalia—both of whom harbor idiosyncratic views about Chevron not shared 
by other Justices—support for Mead on the Court today is solid. 
C. City of Arlington v. FCC 
I come then to the Court‘s decision in City of Arlington v. FCC.  The 
underlying question in the case concerned the meaning of an amendment to 
the Federal Communications Act adopted in 1996 that requires local land 
use agencies to process applications to construct or expand wireless 
transmission towers ―within a reasonable period of time.‖108  The statute 
provided that parties who believe requests are not being processed within a 
reasonable time could seek relief in a ―court of competent jurisdiction.‖109  
There was not a word in the amendment about FCC implementation or 
enforcement of the reasonable time mandate.  After initially disclaiming 
authority under the statute, the FCC changed its mind and issued a 
declaratory order interpreting reasonable time presumptively to mean no 
more than ninety days in the case of a tower expansion or 150 days in the 
case of new construction of a wireless tower.110  The Fifth Circuit, in 
 
 104. Id. at 173–74. 
 105. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 106. Id. at 1014–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 296 
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 244–45 (2005) 
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 108. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 109. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
 110. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 234–36 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863 (2013). 
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reviewing a challenge to the declaratory order by several local 
governments, recognized that the case presented a question about whether 
the FCC had ―jurisdiction‖ to interpret the reasonable time provision.111  
Following circuit precedent, it held that Chevron applied to jurisdictional 
questions, and it deferred to the FCC‘s interpretation that it had 
jurisdiction.112  It also applied Chevron on the merits, and upheld the FCC‘s 
time limits as a permissible interpretation of ―reasonable period of time.‖113 
The Court granted review limited to the question whether ―a court should 
apply Chevron to review an agency‘s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction.‖114  It declined to review whether the FCC had jurisdiction to 
limit or affect state and local zoning authority over the placement of 
wireless service facilities.115  In other words, the Court agreed to decide the 
abstract ―meta-question‖ whether courts should apply Chevron to agencies‘ 
interpretations of their own authority, but nothing else.116  Five Justices 
joined in an opinion by Justice Scalia answering the meta-question in the 
affirmative.  Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented. 
For Justice Scalia and the majority, the case was about preserving the 
workability of the decisional framework set forth in Chevron.  The primary 
thrust of the opinion, which had been previewed years earlier by Justice 
Scalia in separate writing,117 was that there is no principled distinction 
between agency statutory interpretations that are jurisdictional and those 
which are not.  Justice Scalia heaped scorn on the jurisdictional-
nonjurisdictional distinction, calling it ―a mirage,‖ an ―empty distraction,‖ a 
―bogeyman,‖ ―specious,‖ and caricaturing the opposing view as urging a 
distinction between ―big, important‖ decisions and ―humdrum, run-of-the 
mill stuff.‖118  He cited numerous Supreme Court decisions in which 
―jurisdictional questions‖ had been resolved by applying or citing 
Chevron.119  He did not acknowledge the supreme irony that somehow he 
 
 111. Id. at 247–48. 
 112. Id. at 249–54. 
 113. Id. at 255–60. 
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354, 381–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 118. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868–73. 
 119. Id. at 1871–72. 
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could identify these cases as posing ―jurisdictional questions,‖ even while 
professing that the distinction was meaningless.  Nor did he note that nearly 
all these decisions were ―drive-by‖ precedents in which the jurisdictional-
nonjurisdictional distinction had not been discussed. 
The clinching argument for the majority, however, was not so much that 
the jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line was meaningless.  Rather it was that 
the line would be manipulated by litigants and lower courts to recapture for 
the judiciary authority to make policy that Chevron had ceded to agencies.  
As Justice Scalia wrote: 
Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself.  Savvy 
challengers of agency action would play the ―jurisdictional‖ card in every 
case.  Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scary-
sounding ―jurisdictional‖-―nonjurisdictional‖ line; others tempted by the 
prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of 
ambiguous statutory commands.  The effect would be to transfer any 
number of interpretative decisions—archetypical Chevron questions, 
about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of competing 
policy interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to federal 
courts.120 
In other words, Justice Scalia saw the case as an assault on Chevron 
motivated by a desire to return to some imagined golden age of judicial 
activism in administrative law. 
It is not my purpose here to offer a point-by-point rebuttal of Justice 
Scalia‘s opinion.  But I cannot resist several observations. 
First, the APA specifically instructs reviewing courts to decide ―all 
relevant questions of law.‖121  Although ignored in Chevron, this provision 
can be reconciled with deference to agency interpretations of law under a 
theory of implied delegation of interpretational authority.  When Congress 
delegates policy authority to an agency with respect to a particular statutory 
provision, this can be seen as an implied instruction to courts to accept 
reasonable agency interpretations of that provision.  In effect, the APA‘s 
general command instructing courts to exercise independent judgment in 
deciding questions of law requires the court to accept reasonable 
interpretations of the agency, because Congress has given the agency 
authority to make policy judgments with respect to the provision in 
question.  However, the APA also enjoins reviewing courts to ―hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 
of statutory right.‖122  This command cannot be reconciled with deference 
to agency interpretations of the scope of their own jurisdiction on a theory 
of implied delegation, since the very question at issue is whether such a 
delegation does or does not exist.  The text of the APA therefore seems 
plainly to require that courts exercise independent judgment about whether 
the agency is acting ―in excess of statutory jurisdiction.‖  Justice Scalia, 
 
 120. Id. at 1873 (citations omitted). 
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ordinarily a master at statutory exegesis, made no effort to square his 
extension of Chevron to questions of agency jurisdiction with the text of the 
APA. 
Second, Justice Scalia acknowledged that there is a ―very real division‖ 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions insofar as judicial 
jurisdiction is concerned.123  He nevertheless insisted that this did not carry 
over to agencies.  The explanation he gave was that judicial decisions made 
outside a court‘s jurisdiction are ultra vires whereas erroneous judicial 
decisions made within the court‘s jurisdiction are not.124  In contrast, he 
insisted, any agency decision contrary to law is ultra vires.125  This may be, 
but Justice Scalia‘s proffered distinction does not explain why the 
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line is conceptually meaningful in the one 
context but not in the other.  If courts can apply the jurisdictional-
nonjurisdictional distinction in deciding whether a judicial judgment is ultra 
vires, why are they incapable of applying the same distinction in deciding 
whether agency action is ultra vires?126 
Third, Justice Scalia dismissed out of hand the idea that discerning the 
limits of the FCC‘s authority had anything to do with federalism.127  The 
only thing at issue, he said, was the meaning of a federal statute, and the 
question was whether its ambiguity should be resolved by a federal agency 
or a federal court.  This, he insisted, was simply a separation of powers 
question, not a question of federalism.128  But, in fact, the underlying 
dispute involved the exercise of local land use authority, unquestionably a 
matter of traditional state and local concern.  Congress had partially 
preempted such authority by requiring that applications for wireless towers 
had to be resolved in a reasonable period of time.  But it stipulated that 
aside from this specific constraint, nothing in the amendment was to limit 
the authority of state and local governments over siting decisions.129  And 
Congress instructed that the reasonable time limit was to be enforced by 
―courts of competent jurisdiction.‖130  In the context of local land use 
disputes, the phrase ―courts of competent jurisdiction‖ invariably means 
state courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve appeals from local 
 
 123. 133 S. Ct. at 1868–69. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1869. 
 126. In some contexts, judicial jurisdiction is governed by statutes which are wholly 
separate from whatever law governs the decision on the merits.  Federal diversity jurisdiction 
under 28  U.S.C. § 1332 is an obvious example:  the statute governing jurisdiction speaks of 
the residence of the parties, whereas the merits are determined by applying the appropriate 
state substantive law.  But in other contexts, such as determining whether federal question 
jurisdiction exists, the very same statute that establishes jurisdiction also governs the 
resolution of a claim on the merits.  Yet courts somehow manage to resolve the question 
whether a federal question is presented without confounding this with the resolution of the 
merits. 
 127. 133 S. Ct. at 1873. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
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zoning boards.131  The FCC‘s interpretation transformed a general standard, 
whose meaning Congress intended local zoning boards and state courts 
define on a case-by-case basis, into a presumption that local agencies must 
abide by specific deadlines established by federal law.  This interpretation 
expanded the scope of preemption—necessarily contracting state and local 
land use authority.  Justice Scalia made no mention of the fact that the 
Court has consistently rejected the application of Chevron to preemption 
questions,132 precisely because those questions have a pronounced effect on 
the balance of authority between the federal government and the states.133 
Fourth, Justice Scalia had little to say in response to the central theme of 
the Chief Justice‘s dissent, namely, that deferring to agency interpretations 
of the scope of their own authority undermines the role of the courts in 
assuring that agencies act within the boundaries laid down by Congress.134  
The solution to the ―fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome,‖ according to Justice 
Scalia, was for courts to strictly enforce statutes at Chevron‘s Step One.135  
What this means, if taken seriously, is that agency power will be limited 
only when Congress has legislated unambiguously to limit it.  In other 
words, it is up to Congress to draft better statutes if the administrative state 
is to be held in check.  With many challenges to significant rulemaking by 
the Obama administration on the horizon (by the EPA, as it undertakes to 
regulate greenhouse gases without clear statutory authority, or under the 
many rulemakings mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act), one wonders if this 
 
 131. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, widely adopted throughout the country, 
provides that appeals from zoning decisions and ordinances are to be filed ―in the circuit 
court of the county in which the premises affected are located.‖ See 5 KENNETH H. YOUNG, 
ANDERSON‘S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 34.31 (4th ed. & Supp. 2008) (reproducing 
statute).  The federal statute requiring that wireless tower siting decisions be made in a 
reasonable time would presumably suffice to create federal question jurisdiction over an 
action challenging the pace of the local zoning process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  Any 
such action might give rise, however, to a demand for federal court abstention under 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), or some 
other abstention doctrine.  Even federal constitutional challenges to zoning decisions must 
generally be channeled through state courts, see Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), which means they are generally 
immune from challenge in federal district courts. See San Remo Hotel v. City of San 
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (relitigating issues decided by state court is precluded in 
federal court).  In practice, therefore, litigation over local zoning decisions is 
overwhelmingly a state court affair. 
 132. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009). 
 133. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) (describing preemption of 
state law as ―a serious intrusion into state sovereignty‖). 
 134. In a curious footnote, Justice Scalia chastised the Chief Justice for characterizing 
agencies as exercising ―legislative‖ and ―judicial‖ power. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863, 1873 n.4 (2013).  He acknowledged that agencies ―make rules‖ and ―conduct 
adjudications,‖ but he insisted that under the Constitution all legislative power is reserved for 
Congress and the judicial power is reserved for the federal courts. Id.  As he has in other 
decisions, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001), Justice 
Scalia seemed to suggest that the massive accumulation of power by federal administrative 
agencies, even if a matter of ―discomfort,‖ is of no constitutional concern as long as the 
correct label (―executive‖) is attached to federal administrative action. City of Arlington, 133 
S. Ct. at 1873 n.4. 
 135. 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
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expansion of executive authority partially explains why Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan signed on to the Scalia opinion. 
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, which must be a puzzle to observers not familiar with his 
previously expressed views about Chevron.  Justice Breyer agreed that the 
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional distinction is ―a mirage.‖136  But he insisted 
that ambiguity is not enough to infer a delegation of authority to an agency 
to exercise primary interpretational authority.  He cited Mead for the 
proposition that Chevron applies when the agency acts with the force of 
law, and he agreed that courts must resolve this question independently, 
without deferring to the agency‘s view.137  But he also quoted from his 
opinion in Barnhart v. Walton138 for the proposition that a variety of 
contextual factors are relevant in determining whether an agency acts with 
the force of law.139  Although it is difficult to be sure, Justice Breyer 
appears to regard the phrase ―force of law‖ as a label stating the conclusion 
that ―Chevron applies‖ (or perhaps ―the court should defer‖), and that in 
making this determination all kinds of Skidmore-like contextual factors are 
relevant.  This is essentially a convoluted way of expressing the view he 
maintained in Christensen, which is that Skidmore captures the basic 
deference doctrine, and Chevron merely stands for the proposition that 
congressional delegation of power to the agency is one factor among many 
to consider in determining whether to defer.140 
Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, 
deserves to enter the annals as one of the classic statements of 
administrative law.  His disagreement with the majority was 
―fundamental.‖141  Deferring to agencies about the scope of their own 
authority would significantly undermine a central reason Congress has 
provided for judicial review in the first place, namely, to assure that 
agencies do not stray from their delegated mandate.  As he summed up in 
his opening paragraph:  ―A court should not defer to an agency until the 
court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference.‖142 
The Chief Justice sought to deflect Justice Scalia‘s debunking of the 
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional line by admitting that ―jurisdiction‖ is a 
word of many meanings and that the ―parties, amici, and court below too 
often use the term ‗jurisdiction‘ imprecisely.‖143  The correct way to frame 
 
 136. Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 137. Id. 
 138. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 139. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875. 
 140. Justice Breyer ultimately concurred in the judgment on the ground that he believed 
the FCC had determined correctly that it has authority to interpret the meaning of the phrase 
―reasonable period of time,‖ id. at 1876–77—which of course was a question the Court had 
declined to review. 
 141. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1879.  In defense of the ―amici‖ (one of whom I represented, see supra *), the 
question presented on which the Court granted review spoke in terms of agency 
―jurisdiction.‖ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at Questions Presented, City of Arlington, 133 
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the inquiry, according the Chief Justice, was whether ―Congress has granted 
the agency interpretative authority over the statutory ambiguity at issue.‖144  
Moreover, this question must be addressed in terms of the specific 
provision before the court.  If Congress has delegated authority to the 
agency to implement or enforce this provision with the force of law, and the 
agency has done so, then Chevron applies in assessing the agency‘s 
interpretation.145  But if Congress has not delegated authority to the agency 
over the provision in question, or the agency has not exercised this authority 
in rendering its interpretation, then Chevron should not apply. 
By way of illustration, the Chief Justice pointed out that many statutes, 
including the Americans with Disabilities Act146 and the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act147, ―parcel out authority to 
multiple agencies.‖148  Clearly, courts must determine, using independent 
judgment, whether an agency opining on the meaning of a provision in one 
of these statutes is in fact the one to which delegated authority has been 
given.  He conceded that ―[a] general delegation to the agency to administer 
the statute will often suffice to satisfy the court that Congress has delegated 
interpretative authority over the ambiguity at issue.‖149  But he added, ―if 
Congress has exempted particular provisions from that authority, that 
exemption must be respected, and the determination whether Congress has 
done so is for the courts alone.‖150 
With respect to Justice Scalia‘s fears of judicial manipulation of the 
inquiry into the scope of agency authority, and of potential judicial 
intrusion into the policymaking sphere of the agencies, the Chief Justice 
responded that larger considerations of constitutional structure were at 
stake.  The judiciary is obligated not only to confine itself to its proper role, 
but also ―to ensure that the other branches do so as well.‖151  The court 
should not abdicate its basic task of fixing the ―boundaries of delegated 
authority.‖152  ―Our duty to police the boundary between the Legislature 
and the Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the 
Judiciary and the Executive. . . .  We do not leave it to the agency to decide 
when it is in charge.‖153 
 
S. Ct. 1863 (No. 11-1545), 2012 WL 2516693.  It is hazardous to insist that the Court should 
consider a different question than the one it has agreed to hear. 
 144. 133 S. Ct. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 1880–81. 
 146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 147. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 148. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1883–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 1884. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1886. 
 152. Id. (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 27 (1983)). 
 153. Id. 
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III.   SECURING STEP ZERO 
Many administrative law scholars have expressed concern that Chevron-
style judicial review can undermine what I have called the judicial function 
of boundary maintenance, and they have accordingly urged that courts 
should continue to exercise independent judgment to assure that the agency 
is acting within the scope of its delegated authority.154  Step Zero, which 
asks whether Congress has delegated interpretational authority to the 
agency, could readily be augmented by adding an inquiry into whether the 
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority or ―jurisdiction.‖  
By rejecting any inquiry into agency ―jurisdiction‖ before turning to 
Chevron, the majority in City of Arlington has seemingly dealt a blow to 
such a conception of Step Zero.  Or perhaps not.  I argue that Step Zero is in 
fact more secure after City of Arlington than ever before.  What is more, 
City of Arlington may have planted the seeds for a meaningful inquiry into 
the scope of an agency‘s regulatory authority as part of Step Zero. 
Ironically, City of Arlington has done more than any decision since Mead 
to secure the core content of Step Zero as a basic limitation on the scope of 
the Chevron doctrine.  The strategy of the government in City of Arlington, 
both in its brief and in Solicitor General Donald Verrilli‘s oral argument, 
was to convince the Court that the two Mead factors provide a fully 
adequate statement of the threshold conditions for application of Chevron.  
The slogan of the government‘s presentation might read:  ―All you need is 
Mead.‖  The first thing Verrilli said when he stood up at oral argument was 
to reaffirm Mead as a basic precondition for the application of Chevron 
deference.155  In response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, he 
acknowledged that this threshold determination had to be made by the court 
exercising de novo review.156  He followed this up with effective jabs at the 
petitioners‘ position, suggesting that any exception for jurisdictional 
questions would turn the interpretation of the Chevron doctrine ―into the 
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.‖157  As he put it at one point: 
[W]hat my friends on the other side are asking is, actually, for an 
additional layer of complexity in the analysis, even after the general 
authority is established to . . . make rules with the force of law and even 
after it‘s established that the rule at issue . . . has been done in the exercise 
of that . . . authority to act with the force of law.158  
 
 154. E.g., Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence:  Chevron 
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497; Ernest 
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989 
(1999); Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts:  Misplaced Metaphors in 
Administrative Law, 41 WM & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1466–67 (2000); Merrill & Hickman, 
supra note 11, at 837; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983).  For opposing views, see Sunstein, supra note 31, at 234–36; 
Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations That Delimit 
the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1994). 
 155. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 30. 
 156. Id. at 35–36. 
 157. Id. at 40. 
 158. Id. at 41–42. 
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The choice he depicted was between a straightforward, well-established 
threshold inquiry—Mead—and ―Pandora‘s box.‖159 
The characterization of a ―jurisdictional‖ inquiry as an additional layer of 
doctrinal complexity in already-convoluted Chevron doctrine appears to 
have been the winning argument.  The multiple petitioners did not help 
matters by filing briefs presenting divergent views of how to define a 
―jurisdictional‖ question.  The brief filed by the International Municipal 
Lawyers Association (IMLA) in particular, which argued that jurisdictional 
questions concern ―who, what, when, or where‖ as opposed to questions 
about ―how,‖160 drew particular skepticism from the Justices.  At oral 
argument, petitioners‘ counsel, Tom Goldstein, repudiated this version of 
the ―jurisdictional‖ inquiry, and attempted to reframe the question in terms 
of whether Congress had delegated authority to interpret the particular 
provision in question, along the lines ultimately adopted by Chief Justice 
Roberts.161  But Justice Kagan demanded that Goldstein state whether his 
position was the same or different than the one espoused in the IMLA brief.  
When he said it was different, she was obviously unpersuaded.162  The 
aversion to turning Chevron into ―the Internal Revenue Code‖ is, I believe, 
the best explanation for how Justice Scalia got five votes to require judges 
to defer to agency‘s views about the scope of their own authority.  The 
government made this step appear less radical than it was, in light of the 
traditions of administrative law, by arguing that judicial enforcement of the 
twin conditions required by Mead would guard against a runaway Chevron 
doctrine. 
Assuming that three and possibly all four of the Justices who joined 
Justice Scalia‘s opinion did so, at least in part, because they were convinced 
that ―all you need is Mead,‖ then we have the explanation for one of the 
more startling aspects of Justice Scalia‘s opinion, namely, his endorsement 
of Mead.  Recall that Justice Scalia penned an extremely vigorous dissent in 
Mead, reiterated his objections to Mead in the strongest terms in Brand X, 
and continued to call for the overruling of Mead in subsequent decisions.163  
In City of Arlington, all the vituperation about Mead suddenly disappeared.  
Evidently the imperative of getting five votes to defeat the ―jurisdictional‖ 
limitation on Chevron was achieved at the price of capitulating on his 
lonely crusade against Mead. 
The surrender occurred late in the majority opinion in City of Arlington.  
In a section of the opinion described as offering a ―few words in response to 
the dissent,‖ Justice Scalia wrote:  ―The dissent is correct that United States 
v. Mead Corp. requires that, for Chevron deference to apply, the agency 
must have received congressional authority to determine the particular 
 
 159. Id. at 33, 54. 
 160. Brief of Respondents International Municipal Lawyers Ass‘n, et al. at 21–35, City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (Nos. 11–1545, 11–1547), 2012 WL 5884820. 
 161. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 11, 27. 
 162. Id. at 60–62. 
 163. See supra notes 95–97, 105–07 and accompanying text. 
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matter at issue in the particular manner adopted.  No one disputes that.‖164  
In saying ―[n]o one disputes that,‖ Justice Scalia might be taken as simply 
agreeing that no one disputes this is what Mead says.  Justice Scalia 
immediately proceeded, however, to distinguish Mead on the ground that 
―Mead denied Chevron deference to action, by an agency with rulemaking 
authority, that was not rulemaking.‖165  This moves beyond a mere 
description of Mead and appears to reflect an acceptance of its core holding.  
Recall that in his dissent in Mead, and before that in his opinion in 
Christensen, Justice Scalia had argued that it did not matter whether an 
agency interpretation was advanced in a format like rulemaking, as long as 
it was the ―authoritative‖ view of the agency, even if set forth in an opinion 
letter or amicus brief.166  He has evidently now abandoned that position.  
An agency that has been delegated rulemaking authority must promulgate 
the interpretation through rulemaking, or perhaps some other format of the 
same degree of legal significance, i.e., one that has the force of law. 
Any doubt about Justice Scalia‘s acceptance of Mead was laid to rest in 
the next paragraph.  After further rebuttal of the dissent, Justice Scalia 
concluded with this statement:  ―It suffices to decide this case that the 
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress 
has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the 
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency 
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖167  
Here we have an affirmative statement that Chevron has ―preconditions,‖ 
that one precondition is the delegation of power to administer a statute 
through rulemaking or adjudication, and that another precondition is the 
―promulgation‖ of the interpretation through an exercise of one of these 
forms of delegated authority.  This is very close, if not identical, to Mead.  
Rulemaking (at least legislative rulemaking) and adjudication (at least 
adjudication that produces self-executing orders) are the modes of agency 
action that have the force of law.  Whether Justice Scalia will continue, in 
the future, to urge Chevron deference to modes of rulemaking and 
adjudication that do not have the force of law (such as opinion letters or 
government amicus briefs) remains to be seen.168  At the very least, he has 
staked out a position in City of Arlington very different from what he 
advocated in his dissent in Mead. 
Justice Breyer of course joined the Court‘s opinion in Mead, although in 
separate opinions before and after Mead he seemed to endorse a kind of 
Skidmore-ized version of Chevron.  In his concurrence in City of Arlington, 
however, Justice Breyer unequivocally reaffirmed his commitment to 
Mead.  He stated flatly that, in deciding whether to defer to an agency 
interpretation, a reviewing judge 
 
 164. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873–74 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra notes 60–62, 95–97, 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 167. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
 168. It may be significant that Justice Scalia never repeats the ―force of law‖ 
characterization of the required type of delegated authority as it was expressed in Mead. 
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will have to decide independently whether Congress delegated authority 
to the agency to provide interpretations of, or to enact rules pursuant to, 
the statute at issue—interpretations or rules that carry with them ―the 
force of law.‖ United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).  If 
so, the reviewing court must give special leeway or ―deference‖ to the 
agency‘s interpretation.169 
As we have seen, Justice Breyer appears to harbor idiosyncratic views about 
what it means for an agency to act with the ―force of law.‖  Be that as it 
may, his separate opinion in City of Arlington puts him fully on board in 
requiring that courts engage in Mead‘s analysis of Step Zero before they 
invoke the type of deference associated with Chevron. 
The bottom line is that, if there was any doubt about the Court‘s fidelity 
to the basic holding of Mead, it has now evaporated.  There is a Step Zero.  
It requires courts to determine in the exercise of independent judgment that 
the agency has been delegated authority to act with the force of law.  It 
requires that the agency render its interpretation of the contested provision 
in the exercise of such authority. 
IV.   A MORE PARTICULARIZED MEAD? 
City of Arlington may also point toward a more robust version of Step 
Zero that limits Chevron to agency interpretations within the scope of their 
delegated authority.  This is because the actual disagreement between 
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts—which mirrors the actual 
disagreement between the positions of the government and petitioners‘ 
counsel Goldstein as it emerged at oral argument—is actually quite narrow.  
The disagreement as it finally emerged was over the level of generality with 
which the first Mead inquiry is conducted—whether Congress has 
delegated authority to the agency to act with the force of law.  Justice 
Scalia, following the lead of the government, insisted that a grant of general 
authority to an agency to act with the force of law is all that is required to 
trigger Chevron.170  Chief Justice Roberts, echoing the position of 
petitioners‘ counsel at oral argument, insisted that the court must ask 
whether Congress delegated power to the agency to act with the force of 
law with respect to the particular question presented.171  Only if the 
reviewing court answers this more particularized inquiry in the affirmative 
can the court apply Chevron. 
If Chief Justice Roberts is right, then the Mead inquiry at Step Zero could 
serve as a means of assuring that Chevron applies only to interpretations of 
provisions that fall within the scope of the delegated authority of the 
agency.  If Congress has delegated authority to an agency to act with the 
force of law with respect to the particular provision in question, then clearly 
this provision is one that resides within the delegated authority of the 
agency.  If Justice Scalia is right, in contrast, a generic grant of rulemaking 
 
 169. 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 170. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 171. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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or adjudicatory power would confer Chevron deference on an agency with 
respect to all disputes about the scope of the agency‘s authority, at least as 
long as the dispute was over a provision in a statute that the agency in some 
sense ―administers.‖ 
When one reads carefully what the Chief Justice wrote about the type of 
inquiry that would be mandated under the more particularized conception of 
delegated authority he advocated, the dispute becomes even narrower.  
Justice Scalia argued that a single generic grant of authority to an agency to 
engage in rulemaking or adjudication is enough to carry the agency into 
Chevron land.172  Chief Justice Roberts in fact agreed that a general grant 
would often be sufficient.  But he insisted that courts should also consider 
arguments to the effect that Congress has ―exempted particular provisions 
from that authority,‖ in which case the general grant would not suffice to 
confer Chevron review.173  Given the concession by the Chief Justice that 
general grants of authority may often suffice, the dispute boils down to 
whether courts, exercising independent judgment, should or should not 
entertain arguments that the particular issue in question has been carved out 
of a general grant of rulemaking or adjudication authority.  It is hard to 
credit Justice Scalia‘s charge that asking whether the particular issue before 
the court is covered by an exception to a general grant of authority would 
represent a ―massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence‖ or lead to 
―chaos.‖174 
Justice Scalia clearly won this round in what promises to be a longer-
term contest over the scope of the Mead inquiry into the scope of delegated 
power.  It is hard for me to imagine that the Court will not end up adopting 
a position closer to that of the Chief Justice than to that of Justice Scalia.  
Another way to frame the issue is to ask whether the first inquiry mandated 
by Mead should be undertaken by reading only part of the agency‘s organic 
act or by reading all of it.  What Justice Scalia was advocating, in effect, 
was a superficial examination of the agency‘s organic statute, looking for 
one general grant of rulemaking or adjudication authority somewhere in the 
legislation.  Once a court discovers such a provision, and concludes that the 
agency‘s interpretation was rendered in a rule or adjudication, Chevron 
kicks in and the court defers to the agency on any and all issues presented 
under the statute.  What Chief Justice Roberts was urging, in contrast, was 
an actual examination of the agency‘s organic statute to see not only if there 
is a general grant of lawmaking authority somewhere but also whether such 
a grant in fact applies to the dispute before the court.  How is it possible to 
offer a principled justification for a superficial reading of a statute as 
opposed to a careful reading of a statute? 
That Justice Scalia‘s position was even plausible was made possible only 
because of a quirk about the organic act in question—the Federal 
Communications Act (FCA).  Like other complex statutes, the FCA 
includes multiple titles, which have been amended many times over the 
 
 172. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 173. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1884 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 1874 (majority opinion). 
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years, and several different grants of rulemaking authority.  Somewhat by 
chance, the Court had previously held (whether correctly or not is another 
matter175) that one of the rulemaking grants in the FCA authorizes 
legislative rules and extends to all portions of the Act, including 
subsequently enacted provisions.176  Thus, without actually reading the 
FCA, Justice Scalia was able to conclude based on precedent that there is a 
rulemaking grant in the FCA that conveys omnibus authority to the agency 
to act with the force of law.  But consider what is likely to happen in a 
future case involving an agency operating under a complex organic statute 
if a party makes a credible argument that a particular rulemaking grant 
applies only to one title of an act, but not to another.  Will the court simply 
conclude, based on the presence of one rulemaking grant, that the agency is 
entitled to Chevron deference on all questions arising under the act that 
implicate the scope of its authority?  It seems impossible that courts should 
do anything other than actually examine the full text of the statute in order 
to determine whether the particular grant of authority extends to the 
contested provision at issue.  This is all Chief Justice Roberts was saying, 
and I cannot help but believe that as other cases arise under different 
statutory schemes, where there is no dispositive precedent to latch on to, 
time will prove him right. 
I would add one important caveat to the Chief Justice‘s reframing of the 
question in terms of a search for delegated authority.  The search for 
exemptions to general grants of lawmaking authority cannot be limited to 
statutes that expressly qualify grants of rulemaking (or adjudicatory) 
authority.  Most agencies have generally worded grants of rulemaking 
authority, most of which were originally understood to confer power only to 
make procedural and internal housekeeping rules.177  For many years, 
however, the Court has construed virtually every generally worded grant of 
rulemaking authority as conferring authority to make legislative rules, 
without regard to the original understanding of Congress when these grants 
were enacted.  This assumption is now embedded in precedents that apply 
to many important agencies, including the EPA, the FDA, the National 
Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.178  The Court, in an 
opinion by the Chief Justice, has even extended this assumption to a general 
 
 175. The rulemaking grant in question is 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).  For a brief 
discussion of the background of this grant, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, 
Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 
519–20 n.264 (2002) (noting that the grant of rulemaking was added by an amendment 
dealing with furnishing reports about the position of ships at sea). 
 176. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377–78 (1999). 
 177. Merrill & Watts, supra note 175, at 493–528. 
 178. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (EPA); Am. Hosp. Ass‘n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991) (NLRB); Household 
Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004) (Federal Reserve Board).  The Court 
first recognized the FDA‘s legislative rulemaking authority in a group of pre-Chevron cases 
known as the Hynson Quartet.  See generally USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 
655 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ciba Corp. v. 
Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 
U.S. 609 (1973). 
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rulemaking grant under the Internal Revenue Code that was long 
understood as limited to authorizing only non-binding interpretative 
rules.179 
Given that general grants of rulemaking authority are now routinely 
(mis)interpreted as conferring authority to act with the force of law, limiting 
the search for exemptions to specific carve-outs from these grants could 
create a pervasive bias in favor of expansive agency authority.  In effect, the 
interpretation of the general rulemaking grants would create a presumption 
in favor of agency authority to act with the force of law with respect to 
every function covered by these generally-worded grants.  Only if Congress 
had the foresight expressly to qualify the general grant of authority would 
there be any limitation on the agency‘s ability to interpret its authority in 
the most generous possible terms. 
The solution is to assure that the search for ―exemptions‖ to Congress‘s 
delegatory intent includes not just an examination of affirmative grants of 
lawmaking and express exceptions to these grants but all types of 
information that courts consider when attempting to ascertain legislative 
intent.  Gonzales v. Oregon,180 cited with approval by the Chief Justice in 
his dissenting opinion, provides an apt illustration.  At issue was a 
regulation issued by the Attorney General interpreting the phrase 
―legitimate medical purpose‖ in the Controlled Substances Act to make it a 
crime to use controlled substances for the purpose of physician-assisted 
suicide.  The Court concluded that the Attorney General had exceeded the 
scope of his delegated authority.  Among the factors the Court invoked in 
support of this conclusion were that the regulation criminalizing the use of 
substances for the stated purpose was ―anomalous‖ given careful 
restrictions on the Attorney General‘s authority to deregister a substance,181 
that the statute generally delegated authority to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services over ―scientific and medical matters,‖182 and that Congress 
had enacted subsequent legislation designed to preserve the authority of the 
Department of Health and Human Services in determining the consensus 
views of the medical community.183  As the Chief Justice noted in City of 
Arlington, the Court in Gonzales considered ―the text, structure, and 
purpose of the Act‖ in concluding ―on its own‖ that the Attorney General 
had exceeded the scope of his delegated authority.184  This is what one 
would expect of an inquiry conducted at Step One, where the court 
exercises de novo review. 
 
 179. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 
(2011). 
 180. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 181. Id. at 262–63. 
 182. Id. at 265. 
 183. Id. at 266. 
 184. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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V.   THE FUTURE OF BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE 
Going forward, there are two plausible pathways to achieving a 
reconciliation between Chevron review and the traditional judicial function 
of boundary maintenance.  Justice Scalia, who clearly believes in the 
importance of boundary maintenance, would achieve a reconciliation by 
engaging periodically in aggressive review of agency action under Step One 
or Step Two of Chevron.  Chief Justice Roberts, who also believes in 
boundary maintenance, would achieve a reconciliation by asking at Step 
Zero whether Congress has in fact delegated authority to the agency to act 
with the force of law with respect to the precise question in controversy.  
For several reasons, I believe the Roberts pathway is the better one. 
The Scalia approach portends a future in which Step One and Step Two 
are applied in an accordion-like fashion.  This is nothing new.  Chevron 
jurisprudence is already afflicted with decisions manipulating these inquires 
in an ad hoc fashion.  Sometimes ―clear‖ means the statute has only one 
possible interpretation; sometimes it means the statute has one meaning that 
is slightly preferred over all others; sometimes ―reasonable‖ means the 
agency interpretation has a rational basis; sometimes it means the agency 
has fully considered all relevant factors.  But using the Step One and Step 
Two inquiries to engage in boundary maintenance would surely exacerbate 
the phenomenon.  When agencies threaten to transgress perceived 
boundaries, ―clear‖ and ―reasonable‖ would become indistinguishable from 
de novo review; when they stay within perceived boundaries these concepts 
would revert to their more common meanings. 
The Roberts approach would not be immune from judicial willfulness.  
But at least it would take place as part of a candid inquiry into whether 
Congress intended the agency to act with the force of law with respect to 
the issue at hand.  The court would be required to address boundary 
maintenance explicitly, not bury it in a discussion about ―clarity‖ or 
―reasonableness.‖  And the court would do so exercising independent 
judgment, free from any need to pretend to be overcoming a presumption in 
favor of deference to the agency. 
There is also the matter of providing appropriate guidance to lower courts 
and agencies.  If the only thing at stake were how the Court writes its own 
opinions, perhaps little would turn on whether boundary maintenance 
questions were tackled at Step One, Two, or Zero.  But for every case in 
which the Court confronts a Chevron question, thousands are decided by 
the lower courts.  Those courts need appropriate guidance in how to resolve 
those questions.  Given the vital importance of judicial review in preserving 
the proper place of agencies in American government, the threshold 
question of agency authority should be highlighted for consideration by the 
lower courts, not obscured. 
The Scalia approach, by relegating boundary maintenance to Step One 
and Step Two, masks the issue in a completely nontransparent fashion.  
There will be no announced criteria alerting lower courts and agencies to 
the types of circumstances that portend a shift from the deference-
promoting version of Step One and Step Two to the deference-denying 
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version.  It is unclear how this lack of transparency would affect lower court 
behavior.  On the one hand, it carries the risk that lower courts would apply 
a mechanical understanding of the Chevron framework in cases involving 
the scope of agency authority, and would defer to agency determinations 
about their own authority whenever the text of the statute is silent or 
ambiguous on the issue.  On the other hand, by expanding the Step One 
inquiry into a de facto form of independent judgment in cases that implicate 
the scope of the agency‘s authority, the Court would risk diluting the lower 
courts‘ understanding of Chevron in circumstances where the issue clearly 
falls within the scope of the agency‘s domain. 
The Roberts approach would run the risk, emphasized by Justice Scalia, 
that courts would substitute their judgment for agencies‘ by finding that 
Congress had not delegated to them the power to act with the force of law.  
But at least it would render the inquiry into the scope of agency authority 
far more transparent.  Courts would have to consider the scope of an 
agency‘s delegated authority before applying Chevron, and would be 
required to find, exercising independent judgment, that such delegated 
authority exists in every case.  Armed with such a mandate, one would 
expect lower courts, at the margins, to pay more attention to the issue and to 
act with greater confidence when confronted with cases of improper agency 
aggrandizement.  If they find that the agency has been delegated lawmaking 
authority, they would be more likely to defer to agency views under 
Chevron. 
Another concern involves the type of information a court can consider in 
resolving questions about the boundaries of agency authority.  The Court is 
fond of saying that Step One of Chevron entails the use of all ordinary tools 
of statutory interpretation.185  But this is misleading.  Several types of 
information that courts draw upon in ordinary statutory interpretation sit 
awkwardly with Chevron.  For instance, it is unclear how substantive (i.e., 
policy-based) canons of interpretation stand relative to Chevron.  Does 
Chevron override, or is it subordinate to, the canon of avoiding 
constitutional questions, the canon disfavoring extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law, the presumption against preemption, or the doctrine of lenity?186  
Moreover, several cases, including Chevron itself, insist that agencies 
eligible for Chevron deference are free to change their mind about the 
meaning of a statute, perhaps in response to changing administrative 
priorities.187  This seems to rule out any consideration of historical practice 
or understandings as part of Step One, even though such considerations 
often carry great weight in determining the boundaries of governmental 
authority.188 
 
 185. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); cf. City of Arlington, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1868 (referring to ―ordinary tools‖ of statutory construction). 
 186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 142–44 (1990). 
 187. E.g., Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005). 
 188. As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: 
The consistent construction by an administrative agency charged with effectuating 
the policy of an enactment carries very considerable weight.  While assertion of 
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Under Justice Scalia‘s approach, boundary enforcement would be 
complicated by all the controversies about Chevron‘s relationship to 
substantive canons of interpretation, as well as by the limitations associated 
with Chevron about the relevance of longstanding agency practice.  Under 
the Roberts approach, courts would exercise independent judgment in 
fixing boundaries, and hence would be free to consider any and all types of 
information that can be drawn upon in constitutional and statutory 
interpretation. 
A final concern relates to the fact that boundary determination involves 
far more than statutory interpretation—the sphere in which Chevron 
operates.  Other constraints that bear on this important function include the 
complex body of law elaborating on the meaning of the Constitution, 
considerations of international law as they are brought to bear through 
treaties and customary law, and an understanding of the evolved roles of the 
federal government and state and local governments in different areas of 
legal regulation.  There is every reason to believe that if and when courts 
perceive that these other bodies of law bear on the issue of agency 
authority, the courts will determine their relevance exercising independent 
judgment.189  To this extent, the determination of boundaries will 
automatically occur at the functional equivalent of Step Zero.  The same is 
likely to be true of agency decisions that implicate the preemption of state 
law, which are given at most ―weight‖ under Skidmore, not Chevron 
deference.190 
Under Justice Scalia‘s approach, the sources that bear on the discernment 
of government boundaries other than federal statutes must be 
accommodated by a series of ad hoc exceptions to Chevron.  Chevron 
applies unless a constitutional law issue is presented, or unless an 
international law issue is presented, or unless a question of federalism is 
presented.  This becomes awkward, since constitutional, international, and 
federalism questions are commonly interwoven with questions of statutory 
interpretation.  For example, the statute may be open to interpretation in 
ways that avoid constitutional questions or that permit compliance with 
international law obligations.  With respect to preemption, the Scalia 
 
authority does not demonstrate its existence, long-continued, uncontested assertion 
is at least evidence that the legislature conveyed the authority.  Similarly, while 
authority conferred does not atrophy by disuse, failure over an extended period to 
exercise it is some proof that it was not given. 
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543 
(1947). 
 189. Compare Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 175 (2001) (declining to defer to agency interpretation of ―navigable‖ waters 
because of concern that this would exceed the outer limits of federal power under the 
Commerce Clause), with United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 
123–26 (1985) (deferring to agency interpretation of ―navigable waters‖ under Chevron 
when no constitutional question was perceived).  See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (resolving an important question about the jurisdiction of the NLRB 
under the canon of constitutional avoidance without any suggestion of deference to the 
position of the Board). 
 190. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 883 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996). 
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approach may lead to a mechanical disjunction between express preemption 
clauses, where Chevron would apply in interpreting the statute, and implied 
preemption, where it would not.191  But this is utterly unrealistic, since the 
proper interpretation of express preemption statutes often requires a 
determination of the permissible degree of tension between federal and state 
law, which cannot be derived in any straightforward way from an 
interpretation of the statute.192  Giving Chevron deference to agency views 
about the express preemption clauses could result in a persistent expansion 
of federal authority at the expense of the states, when courts would be more 
sensitive to traditional federal-state balance.193 
Under the Roberts approach, all legal sources that bear on the 
identification of governmental boundaries can be seamlessly integrated at 
Step Zero.  Even assuming that agencies have a superior understanding of 
the statutes they are specifically charged with administering, it does not 
follow that they have much, if any, understanding of constitutional law, 
international law, or federalism.  Understanding and applying these 
fundamental legal principles requires more than parsing the words of 
statutes.  It requires knowledge of historically derived conventions about 
the appropriate functions of different legal institutions–matters that require 
a more contextual analysis than simply identifying gaps and ambiguities in 
a statute.  There is every reason to believe that courts are the preferred 
institution for understanding and integrating these sources.194 
My colleague Peter Strauss, writing in this symposium, bemoans the 
failure of both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts to consider whether 
Skidmore is the appropriate standard to apply in determining whether an 
agency is acting within the scope of its authority.195  I agree that it would be 
desirable to attend to the agency‘s reasons for claiming authority over a 
matter, and to ask whether these reasons are persuasive, as Skidmore would 
require.  Applying Skidmore to ―jurisdictional‖ questions would also 
synchronize questions about the scope of agency authority with questions 
about preemption, where the Court has said Skidmore, rather than either 
 
 191. Justice Scalia has ―assumed‖ that the question whether a statute impliedly preempts 
state law ―must always be decided de novo by the courts.‖ Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 
517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996); see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 38–44 
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House Ass‘n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2732 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (applying 
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Chevron or de novo review, should apply.  One could plausibly argue, 
therefore, that Skidmore review is the first-best solution to questions about 
the scope of agency authority.  Skidmore cannot be applied at Step Zero, 
however, because one of the questions a court seeks to resolve at Step Zero 
is whether Skidmore, as opposed to Chevron or de novo review, is the 
proper standard of review!  Chief Justice Roberts‘s proposal to monitor 
questions of agency jurisdiction as part of Step Zero, where the court 
exercises de novo review, should therefore probably be regarded as a 
second-best solution.  Given City of Arlington, however, the only feasible 
option going forward for engaging in boundary maintenance is the Step 
Zero approach outlined by the Chief Justice.  One would of course expect 
and hope that courts will pay attention to the agency‘s reasons for asserting 
authority, even if in doing so they are exercising a form of de novo review. 
In sum, Justice Scalia puts Chevron first and requires a court, if it is to 
engage in boundary maintenance, to squeeze its inquiry into the Chevron 
framework.  This means, outside the rare case where the agency has 
transgressed a clear legislative limit or has adopted a manifestly 
unreasonable interpretation of its organic statute, a court must distort the 
inquiries at Step One and Step Two in order to preserve the structure of 
governmental authority.  This is unfortunate, because it lacks candor, 
provides little predictability or guidance to lower courts and agencies, and 
threatens to dilute the utility of Chevron as a true deference doctrine.  The 
Chief Justice‘s approach to reconciling Chevron and the boundary 
maintenance function, in contrast, is far more transparent, allows the court 
to draw upon all sources of law in determining whether Congress intended 
to delegate lawmaking authority to the agency, and preserves Chevron in 
full force in cases where it properly applies. 
CONCLUSION 
In Mead, Justice Souter characterized the root of the disagreement 
between the majority and Justice Scalia as pitting those who would ―limit 
and simplify‖ against those who would ―tailor deference to variety.‖196  
Tailoring prevailed in Mead, but in City of Arlington, Justice Scalia 
mounted a partial comeback, gaining five votes for those who would ―limit 
and simplify‖ in the face of what they perceived to be a proposal for more 
complexity.  As Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent reveals, however, the real 
dispute in City of Arlington was not one between simple and complex, but 
between general and particular.  Specifically, the issue was whether judges 
should defer to agencies‘ interpretations of the scope of their own authority 
whenever they have been given general authority to act with the force of 
law, as opposed to an approach that would ask whether the agency has been 
given authority to act with the force of law with respect to the precise 
question in controversy.  General versus particular is not the same thing as 
simple versus complex.  Deciding the particular issue before them is what 
judges are supposed to do, without regard to whether the relevant law is 
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simple or complex.  The Chief Justice‘s suggestion does not require a 
repudiation of City of Arlington.  It merely requires a refinement of Mead‘s 
Step Zero—something all members of the Court now say is required before 
Chevron applies. One hopes that the law will evolve in this direction, if 
courts are to continue to engage effectively in the important function of 
boundary maintenance in reviewing agency action. 
